The purpose of the present study was to examine the participation of a variety of variables in gambling behavior. Fortyfive subjects were exposed to an experimental roulette game played for course extra-credit points. In Phase 1, subjects played a fair game (Le., completely random outcomes) without any instructions regarding the programmed contingencies for 75 trials. During Phase 2, subjects were exposed to an adjusted game with payback percentages of either p = .2, P = .8, or continued at p = fair and instructions related to play. Lastly, during Phase 3 all subjects were exposed to an adjusted game with a payback percentage of .2 and an option for escape. Results show that subjects exposed to inaccurate rules regarding play took higher levels of risk, made larger bets, and chose the escape option later than subjects exposed to accurate or no rules related to play. Although reinforcement density varied across subjects exposed to the same rule condition, there was no significant effect of that manipulation on subsequent gambles.
lose than win. Because winning is possible, however, many individuals continue to take risks despite repeated losses.
Most theories of gambling or risk-taking focus on characteristics of the gambler. These hypothesized qualities range from sensation-seeking personalities (Caldwell, 1974; Dickerson, Fabre, & Bayliss, 1986) to the possession of biases and heuristics (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972) . These approaches, in presupposing that some individuals are prone to gambling while others are not, have led to the development of methods designed to prevent gambling-prone individuals from being exposed to gambling, with little attention being paid to the variables responsible for their having started and continued to gamble. Additionally, the previously stated quadrupling of financial losses from gambling indicates th~t either the prevalence of this "personality" is somehow on the rise, or that other variables may be involved in the maintenance of gambling behavior.
One such potentially important variable controlling gambling may be the schedule of reinforcement that the player is exposed to (Knapp, 1976; Martin & Pear, 1992) . In the case of slot machines, video poker, keno, or . roulette, that schedule is a variable-ratio or random-ratio reinforcement schedule. This is a schedule of reinforcement that is commonly programmed such that responses are reinforced after an average, or mean, number of responses have been emitted Ferster & Skinner, 1957; Mazur, 1994 ). Yet, another less common way that these schedules can be programmed is where every response has a constant probability of reinforcement, that is, a random-ratio schedule of reinforcement (Schwartz, 1992) . It is this latter type of programming of the schedule that is utilized in casino games. Each trial has a certain probability of producing a win. Basic human operant responding on such schedules occurs at high rates and is very difficult to extinguish because of the possibility of immediate reinforcement following every response (Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991) . Additionally, the repeated pure chance correlation between a gamble and a win may lead to increased risky gambles in the future (Dixon, Hayes, Rehfeldt, & Ebbs, 1998) , or beliefs of personal control over such pure chance outcomes Ladouceur, Gaboury, Dumont, & Rochette, 1988) .
Verbal stimuli may also participate in the maintenance of gambling behavior by serving as "augmentals" (Hayes, Zettle, & Rosenfarb, 1987) or verbal establishing operations to increase risk taking. A player may hear from his fellow gamblers in the casino "Your bad luck is bound to change," "always bet on black if the last number was red," or ''the higher you bet, the more you will win." Such instructions are also often found in advertisements for casinos stating ''the loosest slots in town," "99% payback on all machines;' or ''ten thousand dollars in winnings everyday!". Yet, in a gambling context, these instructions are often incomplete descriptions of contingencies and therefore misleading. Although the player may be contacting the aversive losing contingencies of these random-ratio schedules, his/her behavior may tend to come under the control of these newly introduced rules.
Although previously published research on rule following has demonstrated that subjects take more trials to contact the programmed contingencies when given general instructions rather than specific instructions Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle, Rosenfarb, & Korn, 1986; LeFrancois, Chase, & Joyce, 1988) , and that response acquisition and variability may be facilitated at the cost of schedule sensitivity by instructions (e.g., Catania, Matthews, & Shimoff, 1982; Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, & Greenway, 1986; Shimoff, Matthews, . & Catania, 1986; Vaughan, 1985) , it is remains unclear what effect if any, delayed introduction of such instructions will have on subjects. This type of situation may be more common in gambling contexts than preexposure to rules, for in gambling players often ''try their luck" at a game before seeking out exposure to the rules which describe the actual contingencies of the game.
In addition to the roles that contingencies of reinforcement and verbal stimuli may play in controlling current gambling behavior, it may be possible that preexperimental histories may influence current performance. Dependent measures used to assess such historical variables of the subject have been shown to be of value when attempting to explain between-subject variability during the experimental task (Wulfert, Greenway, Farkas, Hayes, & Dougher, 1994) . Utilizing similar techniques relevant to gambling behavior may be of importance when attempting to understand the variability in risk taking among subjects in a gaming context.
One such self-report used to assess an individual's propensity of risk taking is the ''Twenty-Item Risk-Taking Questionnaire" (Knowles, 1976) . Another self-report is the "Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale" (Rotter, 1966) , which examines a person's beliefs in whether reinforcement in their lives is externally (Le., chance, gods, others) or internally controlled (Le., personal skill, hard work). Although the Rotter (1966) questionnaire was not designed specifically for predicting gambling behavior, it may still provide inSight as to why a player may continue to gamble when the negative consequences for doing so have occurred.
In summary, the purpose of the present study was to examine the risk-taking behavior of subjects in a gambling context, where wagers were made for course extra-credit points. First, we attempted to assess the effects of various reinforcement histories on subsequent gambling behavior by controlling the actual probabilities of winning at the pure chance game of roulette. This was done by having subjects play a computerized version of the game where the experimenter predetermined the random-ratio values of the schedules of reinforcement. Second, we attempted to investigate the role of delayed rule introduction and potential subsequent rule following on gambling behavior of subjects. This was accomplished by initially exposing subjects to the computerized game without any instructions related to play strategy, and subsequently delivering accurate, inaccurate, or no instructions to equal numbers of subjects. Third, we attempted to assess the correlation between historical self-reported measures of risk taking and actual risk-taking performance. This was accomplished by administering two preexperimental questionnaires to all subjects and comparing those scores to observed behavior during our experimental gambling context. Observed gambling behavior was measured in two ways: the number of trials a subject played before terminating the game, and the level of risk the subject engaged in during play.
Method

Subjects
Forty-five undergraduate students attending the University of Nevada participated for the opportunity to earn course extra-credit.
Subject Recruitment
Subjects were recruited through the public posting of a description of the experiment and its compensation outside the psychology department's office on a table where descriptions of all other current research projects available for participation were located.
Experimental Setting
All experimental sessions were conducted in a 141 x 10 1 room within the Psychology Department at the University of Nevada. The room was equipped with a table, chair, and personal computer.
Programming of the roulette game, collection of dependent measures, and all other manipulations were made in Visual 8asic™ (Version 5) for Windows 95®.
Subject Assignment to Conditions
Subjects were randomly assigned to one of the nine conditions of the experiment. Subjects were added to each condition whenever a subject dropped out to ensure equal group size and sufficient sample size.
Procedure
Preexperimental questionnaires. All subjects were instructed to complete two self-assessment questionnaires related to risk-taking behavior and beliefs in illusionary control. The first was the ''Twenty-Item Risk-Taking Questionnaire" (Knowles, 1976) and the second was the "Rotter Internal-External Locus of Control Scale" (Rotter, 1966) .
Experimental procedure. All subjects were instructed as to the rules of the game of roulette by the experimenter while the image of the roulette game was displayed on the computer screen. Figure 1 shows an example of this screen display.
The game of roulette is played using a wheel and a board consisting of black, red, and green numbers ranging from 00-36. The object of the game is to bet chips on the number(s) on the board that you believe might come up when the wheel is spun. Since this is a computerized version of the 8: 1 Bets 1 sf 12 2 nd 12 .
1 : 1 Bets Figure 1 . Screen graphic of the roulette table and available bets subjects could make during the course of the game.
game, you will make bets on the computer screen which resembles the board , and press the "spin" button to simulate a spin on the roulette wheel. If the number that appears in the box above the "spin" button is a number that you have placed a bet on, you will win additional chips. Yet, if the number that appears in the box is not a number that you have placed a bet on, you will lose all chips bet for that game.
To make a bet, click the mouse pointer on the desired location. An image will appear in that location to identity that a bet has been made. If you wish to change your bet, click on the "cancel" button located on the top of the screen. Bets can be made in a number of different ways. There are three types of bets and you may choose anyone or any combination of them on each game.
You may make a bet in the bottom row of the board (odd, even, black, red , 1-18, 19-36) . If the number (and/or its corresponding color) that appears in the box above the "spin" button matches a bet that you have made, you will win double your chip(s) bet. For example, if you bet 2 chips on the space "red", and the number that comes up is red, then you will receive a total of 4 chips in return . These bets are called 1:1 bets.
You may also bet in the next row up on the board (1 st 12, 2 nd 12, 3 rd 12) or the right column of the board (2:1s). If the number that appears in the box above the "spin" button matches a bet that you have made, you will win triple your chip(s) bet. For example, if you bet 2 chips on the space "1 st 12", and the number that comes up is between 1 and 12, then you will receive a total of 6 chips in return . These bets are called 2:1 bets.
You may also bet in the intersections of every four numbers located in the middle of the board (for example: the intersection of 8, 9, 11, and 12). If the number that appears in the box above the "spin" button matches a bet that you have made, you will win eight times your chip(s) bet. For example, if you bet 2 chips on the space between "8, 9, 11, & 12", and the number that comes up is either 8, 9, 11, or 12, then you will receive a total of 16 chips in return. These bets are called 8:1 bets.
As you might see, no bets can be made on the 0 or the 00 spaces. Therefore, if either of these numbers appear in the box above the "spin" button, all chips bet on this game will be lost.
Once the experimenter completed these instructions and the subject had no further questions, they were told the following:
You will be given 80 chips to start with . Each chip is worth 1/20 of an extracredit point that will be added to your final course grade. In other words, you are starting off with 4 extra-credit points with which to play the game. You may win a maximum of 7 credits or lose a maximum of 3. Therefore, if you lose all of your chips, you will still receive 1 extra-credit point simply for your participation. The points earned by the end of your participation will be added to your final course grade. Your task is to win as many chips as possible. You are required to make a bet on every trial of the game, and are to continue playing until told otherwise.
At this point if there were no further questions, the experimenter left the room, and the subject began the experiment. If any subject had ques~ions, the experimenter reread the relevant portion of the above instructions.
Phase 1. Unbiased contingencies and no rules. All subjects were required to play the game for 75 trials. During this time the contingencies of the game remained unbiased. That is, the outcome of each trial was completely due to chance, with the probability of winning being p = .47 for 1:1 bets, p = .32 for 2:1 bets, and p = .11 for 8:1 bets.
Phase 2. Biased contingencies and rule delivery. An unsignaled change of contingencies occurred. Subjects were required to play the game for 75 additional trials under biased reinforcement contingencies. That is, the outcome of each trial was no longer determined by chance, but was predetermined by experimenter manipulation of winning probability. There were three different reinforcement probability levels p = .2, P = ;8, or a continuation of Phase 1 p levels (Le., "fair game") which remained constant on each trial and for all types of bets. Each subject was exposed to one given probability level, yielding overall 15 subjects per level.
Additionally, at this time subjects were further divided into one of three instructional groups for each probability level, yielding overall 15 subjects per instructional group, or 5 at each probability level. Subjects received no additional, a set of "accurate," or a set of "inaccurate" instructions via the computer interface which remained on the screeI') until the game was terminated. The use of the terms "accurate" and "inaccurate" instructions pertain to the rules for a fair roulette game, not necessarily the subsequent contingencies that subjects were exposed to. Accurate rules were as follows:
• Roulette is a losing game, you should quit as soon as possible.
• It is best to bet on the 1:1 bets since your chances of winning on a given game are greater here.
• It is best to bet only a small number of chips per game since you risk less chips this way.
• If you have been losing for a while, there is no reason to believe that your luck will change.
Inaccurate rules were as follows:
• Roulette is a winning game, you should playas soon as possible.
• It is best to bet on the 8:1 bets since your chances of winning on a given game are greater here.
• It is best to bet only a large number of chips per game since you risk less chips this way.
• If you have been losing for a while, there is every reason to believe that your luck will change. Table 1 shows a listing of all groups with their respective reinforcement probability for each phase and rule condition. Phase 3. Minimum reinforcement probability with an option for escape behavior. Following the first 150 forced trials, an unsignaled · change of contingencies was made to p = .2 probability of reinforcement for all subjects. Additionally a "quit" button appeared at the bottom of the screen, and subjects were instructed the following:
At anytime from now on, you may stop playing the game, and cash-in your chips for extra-credit points. To do so, click the mouse pointer on the "Quit" button. Remember, every 20 chips equal 1 extra-credit point.
Results
Terminating the game. When subjects were exposed to the optional Phase 3 contingencies, continuation of play varied across subjects and across rule conditions. Specifically, 8 subjects exposed to accurate rules, 8 subjects exposed to inaccurate rules, and 4 subjects exposed to no rules continued to play the game, and therefore were exposed to Phase 3 contingencies. In an attempt to arrive at a predictive model of why an individual may continue to play the game once they have the option to quit, a logit discrete-time hazard model (Yamaguchi, 1991) , also known as a proportional odds ratio, was used. This analysis was selected over an ANOVA or usual regression analysis because the response of interest was discrete (rather than continuous) and over time (number of trials before quitting), and because it needed to accommodate subjects who were forced to quit at the 1 oath trial (known as censored observations).
Using the logit regression model, the conditional probability (P _{it}) of quitting at trial t given that the subject has not yet quit was calculated. This regression model predicts the "natural logarithm of the odds (O_{it} = P _{it} I 1 -P _{it}) of quitting at time t given that the subject has not yet quit.
Note that the higher the odds, the higher the probability of quitting. The form of the log it regression model is given by:
where the Xs are factors and lor covariates in the regression model. In this case, the factors of interest were the rule condition (Rule) and the Note. X1-X4 are qualitative variables assigned either a value of 1 or a 0 depending on condition, and X5-X8 are quantitative variables utilizing their obtained values. reinforcement density (RFT) given to each subject. Because these factors are categorical, each with three levels, two indicator variables having 0-1 values needed to be defined for each of these factors. X_1 (value of 1 if Rule 1,0 otherwise) and X_2 (value of 1 if Rule 2,0 if otherwise) were indicator variables for rule condition, and X_3 (value of 1 if P = fair, 0 if otherwise) and X_ 4 (value of 1 if P = .2, 0 if otherwise) were indicator variables for reinforcement density. In addition, there were four quantitative covariates incorporated in the model. Specifically, cumulative reinforcement at the end of Phase 1 and Phase 2 (X_5 and X_6) and scores on the Rotter (1966) and the Knowles (1976) questionnaires (X_7 and X_8). Table 2 shows each one of these predictive variables and its numerical range.
In order to determine the appropriateness of this model for the current data set, a Pearson Chi-Square Goodness-of-Fit Test yielded value of 12.62 (df 36, P > .3188). Because this value was not significant, the LOGIT model was considered appropriate. A Pearson Correlation test was also conducted to consider potential problems with multicollinearity among covariates (Le., individual reinforcement history during Phase 1 and Phase 2, and preexperimental questionnaire scores). This test Results of this analysis yielded highly significant values only for the predictive variables of rule conditions (p < .01). In other words, the only variable that had an influence on a given subject's conditional probability of quitting at time t, given that he or she had not quit yet, was the set of rules that were given to him or her at the onset of Phase 2. Levels of reinforcement Note. Only X1 and X2 (rule conditions) were found to be a significant predictor of observed behavior (Le., terminating the game).
probability, individual histories of reinforcement, and preexperimental questionnaire scores were not highly significant (p > .01). Table 3 displays each one of these variables, their corresponding degrees of freedom, standard error, chi square values, and significance levels. Using the significant parameter estimates, odds were estimated for each of the three rule groups of subjects. This quantification describes the . estimated odds of the tth individual quitting at trial t given that they have not quit yet, and which can be recalled as follows:
In addition, odds ratios were estimated for accurate vs. inaccurate rules groups, accurate vs. no rules group, and inaccurate vs. no rules group. Estimated odds ratio values were 10.98, 0.037, and 0.003 respectively. When the ratio is greater than 1, it implies that the first of the two groups being compared is more likely to quit than the second group. When the ratio is less than 1, it implies that the second of the two groups is more likely to quit.
The first ratio indicates that a subject given accurate rules was more likely to quit at time t during Phase 3 if he or she had not quit yet, than a subject given inaccurate rules. The second ratio indicates that a subject given accurate rules was less likely to quit at time t during Phase 3 if he or she had not quit yet, than a subject given no rules. The third ratio indicates that a subject given inaccurate rules was less likely to quit at time t during Phase 3 if he or she had not quit yet, than a subject given no rules. Another way to interpret the results of a logit model is to calculate the relative risk (Agresti, 1996) of quitting the game between groups of subjects. Relative risk would be defined here as how much more often a subject in one group quits the game at time t given that he or she has not quit yet, relative to a subject in another group. To calculate relative risk, conditional probabilities are calculated for each group by taking the estimated odds for that group and dividing them by 1 + the estimated odds for that group. Conditional Probability = e (fi tted model wI qualitative variables for relevant rule condition) / 1 + e(fitted model ... ).
Next, relative risk values were computed by taking the ratio of one rule group and dividing it by another group.
Relative-Risk = Conditional Probability of Group 1 / Conditional Probability of Group 2.
The resulting relative risk values for the three rule group comparisons were: 9.6197 for accurate rules versus inaccurate rules, .1685 for accurate rules versus no rules, and .0175 for inaccurate rules versus no rules. These values indicate that subjects in the accurate rules group were 9.6197 times more likely to quit the game at time t given that they had not quit yet than subjects in the inaccurate rules group. Since the other two resulting risk values were negative, a practical way to interpret them is to reverse positions of the groups in the calculation of relative risk. That is, rather than compare the accurate rules group to the no rules group, one would compare the no rules group to the accurate rules group. The same is true for the inaccurate rules group versus the no rules group comparison. Therefore, subjects in the no rules group were 5.934 times more likely to quit the game at time t given that they had not quit yet than subjects in the accurate rules condition. Subjects in the no rules group were 57.08 times more likely to quit the game at time t given that they had not quit yet than subjects in the accurate rules condition.
Risk Taking
In order to quantify an individual subject's level of risk taking during the experiment, risk coefficients (Ladouceur, Mayrand, & Tourigny, 1987; Dixon, Hayes, Rehfeldt & Ebbs, 1998) were computed. This quantification allowed for a measurement of risk that incorporated both the number of chips that were bet as well as the odds at which they were bet. This risk coefficient was defined as follows:
where A was the total number of chips bet at a given odds during a given phase, Bwas the odds in terms of a fraction, and Cwas the total number of chips bet during that phase. Since the risk coefficient incorporated both odds and quantity of chips, performances of those subjects exposed to either accurate or inaccurate rules were compared to the extent of their potential subsequent rule following. Figure 2 shows each individual subject's initial risk-coefficient value during Phase 1, and subsequent risk-coefficient value during Phase 2. Lower values depict higher levels of risk taking.
The Phase 2 risk-taking of subjects exposed to accurate rules regarding play decreased, while risk taking of subjects exposed to inaccurate rules increased from initial levels observed during Phase 1. Risk taking of subjects exposed to no rules regarding play showed a slight increase during Phase 2 compared to that of Phase 1.
A repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to determine the significance of differences in risk-coefficient values between Phase 1 and Phase 2 within subjects. This type of ANOVA test assumes that the sample data have been selected from a normal distribution. Therefore, three separate tests for normality of the riskcoefficient data were conducted. The Working-Hotelling, the KolmogorovSmirnov, and the Anderson-Darling tests all yielded nonsignificant values (p> .05), indicating that the normality assumption of the error terms had not been violated. The ANOVA analysis yielded a significant interaction between the set of rules given to the subject (i.e., accurate, inaccurate, or no rules) and time (i.e., Phase 1 or Phase 2) (F (2, 89) = 13.84, P < .
. 0001). No significant interactions were obtained for reinforcement density and time, nor for the set of rules, reinforcement density, and time (p> .05). Because not all subjects chose to continue play during Phase 3, and because those who did varied in the number of trials played, no statistical comparison could be made across or within subjects. Rather, a graphical 
Reinforcement Probability in Phase 2 representation of those 20 subjects' Phase 3 risk-coefficient values is found in Figure 3 . It appears that all 8 subjects' risk-coefficient values in the accurate rules group stayed about the same as they were during Phase 2. In contrast, subjects' risk-coefficient values in the inaccurate rules and no rules groups varied from their individual values during Phase 2. Five subjects in the inaccurate rules group (LlS3, HIS1, FIS2, FIS3, & FIS4) and two subjects in the no rules group (HNS5 & FNS5) had Phase 3 risk-coefficient values at least .05 higher than those of Phase 2. All of these subjects' ending Phase 3 reinforcement levels were less than they were during Phase 2. The 2 remaining subjects in these two instructional groups (LlS2 & LlS4) had Phase 3 risk-coefficient values at least .05 lower than those of Phase 2. Both of these subjects' ending Phase 3 reinforcement levels were greater than they were during Phase 2.
Self-Report and Actual Performance Correlations
Scores on the Rotter (1966) questionnaire may range from 0 to 23. Higher scores indicate stronger beliefs in external control of reinforcement. Scores on the Knowles (1976) questionnaire may range from 20 to 100. Higher scores indicate greater propensity to take risks.
Pearson Product Moment Correlations between each of the selfreport questionnaire scores and actual performance during the experiment were conducted to assess the relative predictive value of these tests on subsequent performance. No significant correlations were found between either the Rotter (1966) 
Discussion
In summary, the purpose of the present study was threefold. First it investigated the role of delayed rule introduction and potential rule following on gambling behavior of subjects playing a computerized roulette game. Results showed that subjects followed newly introduced rules related to termination · of the game and risk-taking levels after having been directly exposed to the contingencies for some time. Previous research has shown that subjects tend to follow rules that were introduced before their actual exposure to programmed contingencies (Hayes, Brownstein, Zettle, et aI., 1986; LeFrancois et aI., 1988; Shimoff et aI., 1986) . Results from the present study imply that subjects may also follow rules that are introduced after prolonged exposure to contingencies.
One unexpected finding of the present study was that the calculated relative-risk for subjects given accurate rules versus subjects given no rules was less than 1 (.1685), suggesting that subjects in the no rules group would quit approximately 6 times sooner at time t than subjects given accurate rules. These findings suggest that the presentation of accurate rules was unnecessary to influence termination of the game, or that subjects in the no rules condition may have been developing accurate self-rules regarding play at either a covert or overt level. It may also be the case that such self-rules rules were functionally equivalent to the externally provided rules to subjects in the accurate rule condition. These results suggest that future research utilizing methods to record subjects' concurrent verbal behavior during experimental tasks to assess self-rule generation as suggested by Hayes (1986) may be warranted.
Previous research by Ladouceur et al. (1987) has shown that riskcoefficient values tend to increase in roulette players over successive trials. The present results support the Ladouceur et al. (1987) findings for subjects in the no rules and inaccurate rules groups, yet are in direct contrast for the case of subjects in the accurate rules group. Therefore, increased risk taking over time is not a static by-product of gambling, but may be actually reduced when subjects are exposed to accurate rules regarding play. This suggests that a rule-governed approach to reducing high-risk gambling may be warranted.
Because the present study was conducted with na"ive roulette players, the accurate rules given to them at the onset of Phase 2 may have exerted greater control over behavior than would be the case for someone with a history of following the opposite inaccurate rules for an extended period of time who is then given accurate rules. This may be a reason for the repeated failure of treatment for pathological gamblers (Collins, 1996) who have been operating under inaccurate rules for a long time. Future research may also wish to explore the effects of initially providing subjects with inaccurate rules and later providing them with the opposite accurate rules and measuring effects on subsequent performance. Such a . study might provide additional answers to how histories of following inaccurate rules may affect the termination of gambling, elevation of risk levels, as well as the possible correlation with length of time behavior remains under their control.
Second, the present study assessed the effects of reinforcement history on gambling behavior and possible rule following. Results show that varying levels of reinforcement was not sufficient to bring about changes with respect to either of these behaviors. Subjects followed rules regardless of their accuracy and in many cases in the face of opposing contacted programmed contingencies. Previous research regarding the potentially greater influence of rules over programmed contingencies (Hayes, Brownstein, Haas, et aI., 1986; Hayes et aI., 1987) supports these findings, and it suggests that the controlling properties of such rules are not limited to their descriptions of reinforcement contingencies, but also to the implied social consequences of following or not following rules.
Another possible reason for the ineffective control of the programmed consequences in the present study was that subjects gambled only for course extra credit points rather than with their own money. Extra credit may not have had the same reinforcing properties as money, yet may be the closest ethical approximation in basic research studies using undergraduates. Also, the extent to which the subject needed the extra credit to increase his or her grade may have served as an establishing operation making winning more or less reinforcing. Generalization of these results to actual casino situations must be made with caution. Yet, these findings do provide an initial direction to advance the behavioral analysis of gambling: that being from a rule-governed perspective.
Third, the present study assessed the correlation between self-reported measures of risk taking and actual risk-taking performance in a gambling context. Results showed that the Rotter (1966) and the Knowles (1976) questionnaires administered to subjects before their completion of the experimental method were poor predictors of observed performance. In contrast, the certain characteristics of the current environmental context produced reliable risk-taking behavior as measured by the number of optional trials played during Phase 3 and the risk-coefficient values. As such, current gambling behavior may be more under the control of present environmental conditions than hypothesized personality variables, as suggested by Caldwell (1974) and Dickerson et al. (1986) .
The history of a subject is obviously relevant when attempting to bring behavior under control in the laboratory. Knowledge of history has been shown to provide some understanding as to why some individuals follow rules while others do not (Wulfurt et aI., 1994) . Likewise, an individual's history of risk taking may be useful in predicting gambling behavior. Yet, the present experiment was conducted with na"ive roulette players with the same history of risk taking with respect to roulette, namely none. Future research may wish to use subjects with various histories of roulette play and to administer questionnaires or evaluations which directly assess gambling problems in an attempt to more accurately predict their actual risk-taking behavior. This strategy depends on the adequacy of such self-report measures however.
In conclusion, gambling behavior is an example of complex human behavior which requires examination of as many potential participating variables as possible. Attempting to explain gambling, or in fact any human behavior, as behavior under the control of a single variable such as the schedule of reinforcement in effect is incomplete at best. Rather, it appears that externally available rules have a considerable influence over the maintenance of gambling behavior and may explain why individuals continue to gamble despite repeated losses. The present results provide a possible foundation for developing applied interventions to reduce gambling behavior.
